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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 SEOUL 000777

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PHUM

SUBJECT: SIXTH ANNUAL ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT

REF: A. SECSTATE 3836

- [1](#)B. 04 SEOUL 4843
- [1](#)C. 05 SEOUL 5240
- [1](#)D. 05 SEOUL 3880
- [1](#)E. SEOUL 689
- [1](#)F. 04 SEOUL 6235
- [1](#)G. SEOUL 321
- [1](#)H. 05 SEOUL 5330

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[1](#)1. (U) Post's submission for the sixth annual Anti-Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report follows. Responses are keyed to questions in Ref A.

SUMMARY

[1](#)2. (SBU) The ROKG continued to make efforts to fight trafficking in persons during the March 2005 to March 2006 reporting period. Government efforts to educate the public and promote compliance with the 2004 Anti-Prostitution/Anti-Trafficking Laws (Ref B) helped raise awareness of prostitution and trafficking as a crime (Ref C, D). Ministry of Gender Equality and Family's (MOGEF) financial support for NGOs helped further the development of a legal and social infrastructure for victims of the sex industry. Local law enforcement agencies and Embassy officials cooperated closely in ongoing investigations of visa brokers connected with international trafficking. Government and NGOs devoted substantial time and resources to anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking programs. In Paragraphs 52 and 53 below, we highlight two projects for consideration as international best practices: a "John School" organized by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to educate men about the hidden costs of trafficking; and an internship program organized by the Magdalena House shelter to help victims of prostitution and trafficking transition into legitimate employment.

[1](#)3. (SBU) Despite making steady progress, the ROK remained a

source, transit and destination country for trafficking in persons. In particular, the trafficking of Korean women to the United States and elsewhere remained a serious problem.
END SUMMARY.

PARAGRAPH 18: OVERVIEW OF ROK ACTIVITIES

14. (SBU) A. The ROK was a source, transit, and destination country for women trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Precise numbers of trafficking victims were unavailable. According to the government's 2003 statistics, approximately 330,000 women were involved in the sex trade. NGOs and other observers continued to believe that the number of Korean sex workers was substantial. Prostitution occurred in a variety of settings, including glass-front brothels, karaoke rooms, massage parlors, and private night clubs ("room salons"). The government reported that, as of September 2005, the size of brothel districts had decreased by 35 percent since before passage of the 2004 laws. However, some observers report that prostitution activity may have in part shifted to more discreet settings, including residential neighborhoods. Also, solicitation was increasingly taking place on-line or through cellular phone text messaging services.

15. (SBU) B. While women in the ROK sex industry were overwhelmingly Korean, NGOs believed that several thousand foreign women from Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Thailand, and other countries of Southeast Asia were also involved. Observers told us that foreign women were trafficked to the ROK through employment agencies,

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travel companies, and international marriage brokers. (NOTE: Foreign women have historically worked in base camps surrounding U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) areas. USFK continued to enforce its zero-tolerance policy towards prostitution and other measures to fight prostitution and human trafficking. Although problems still existed, an NGO that works exclusively with basecamp communities reported the closure of a number of clubs and a decrease in the number of foreign women working near U.S. bases. END NOTE.).

16. (SBU) B. (Cont.) Traffickers used debt bondage and threats of exposure to ensure compliance. Victims accumulated debt as traffickers encouraged them to borrow money for clothes, makeup, accessories or rent. Victims accumulated further debt through penalties for being late to work, being sick or committing other alleged infractions of work rules. Some victims reported that they were approached by friends or acquaintances and promised easy and lucrative incomes. Others reported that they approached employment agents who placed them in cafes or other establishments where they were compelled to provide sexual services. NGOs reported that employment agencies promised runaway youth employment assistance, but instead sold them to sex-related establishments. Victims were predominantly young Korean women in difficult economic or social situations, often characterized by family violence or broken families.

17. (SBU) B. (Cont.) Korean women were trafficked to the United States, sometimes via Canada (where Korean nationals may travel without a visa) or Mexico. They also entered the United States on non-immigrant visas, sometimes issued on the basis of false documents. Korean women were also trafficked to Japan, Saipan, Guam, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Western Europe. Some NGOs speculated that the trafficking of Korean women overseas may have increased since the enactment of the 2004 legislation.

18. (SBU) B. (Cont.) Among the victims trafficked to the United States with non-immigrant visas, a growing number appeared to be traveling on student visas. Post's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU), working in cooperation with local

authorities, uncovered a ring of fraudulent-document producers and visa brokers who worked in the U.S., Korea and, possibly other Asian countries (Ref E). The brokers assisted poorly qualified applicants to obtain real I-20 forms and fraudulent Korean university diplomas and transcripts. Upon arrival in the U.S., organizers forced some Korean women to work in the sex industry as strippers, prostitutes, or masseuses. To date, there have been nine arrests of visa brokers as a result of this ongoing investigation.

¶9. (SBU) B. (Cont.) The National Assembly, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), the Korean National Police, and local police in a number of jurisdictions demonstrated the political will to address trafficking in persons. We look forward to improved cooperation from the MOJ. In November 2004, the MOJ at Embassy Seoul's request initiated a Trilateral Working Group (TWG) to address in quarterly meetings the trafficking of Korean women from the ROK into the U.S. through Canada (Ref F). In the inaugural meeting, the MOJ's position was, in essence, that if the Korean women traveled to Canada legally, their attempt later illegally to enter the United States was a Canada-U.S. border issue over which the ROKG had no control. During the reporting period, the MOJ failed to convene another TWG meeting. Despite repeated high-level assurances, MOJ has yet to schedule any follow-up meetings (Ref G).

¶10. (SBU) C. The government's main limitation remained societal attitudes regarding prostitution. While attitudes were changing, many Koreans still regarded prostitution as a customary part of business and social relations. Business interests, in particular, were wary about the impact that a crackdown on prostitution could have on the economy.

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Further, some sex workers argued that they had a right to choose their vocation, even if it was prostitution. The ROKG devoted substantial resources to its anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking efforts. In 2005, the government spent 22.2 billion won (USD 22,560,334) on financial aid to victims. Corruption was not reported to be a major problem.

¶11. (U) D. The MOGEF engaged in efforts to monitor its anti-trafficking efforts and periodically made available its assessments. In addition to the quarterly meetings of its multi-agency anti-trafficking task force, the government plans to issue a report in September 2006 on the efficacy of the 2004 Anti-Prostitution/Anti-Trafficking Laws.

PARAGRAPH 22: PREVENTION

¶12. (U) A. In 2005, the ROK acknowledged that trafficking was a problem to the extent that foreign women may be trafficked to areas surrounding military camp towns.

¶13. (U) B. The following government agencies were involved in anti-trafficking efforts: Ministry of Justice; Supreme Public Prosecutors Office; Korean National Police Agency (KNPA); Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF); Ministry of Labor; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Ministry of Culture and Tourism; Maritime Police Administration; and, the National Information Agency.

¶14. (U) C. During the reporting period, the MOGEF and the KNPA conducted periodic briefings and media interviews. The MOGEF managed a hotline that provided English, Russian and Chinese interpretation services and facilitated social, legal and medical assistance for victims. The KNPA distributed educational material to women, Korean and foreign, working in entertainment venues on their rights and how to report any abuses.

¶15. (U) D. The MOGEF sponsored various occupational training and employment support programs for women. The

government also provided women entrepreneurs with grants and low interest loans. In addition, election laws provided that National Assembly elections, 50 percent of each party's proportional representatives and 30 percent of each party's geographic representatives must be women. In March 2005, the National Assembly eliminated the "hojuje," a household registration system that made women legally subordinate to the male family head.

¶16. (U) D. (Cont.) To help reduce the demand for prostitution and human trafficking, the MOJ's Probation and Parole Division created a "John School" to educate men about the hidden costs of prostitution (Ref H). Over one thousand men have participated in the program, which was a mandatory eight-hour class for first offenders arrested for purchasing, or attempting to purchase, sex. The curriculum included testimony from trafficking victims, HIV/AIDS awareness, and other social and health information. The government also targeted military servicemen and reserve forces with an anti-prostitution campaign.

¶17. (U) F. (NOTE: Para E omitted in Ref A. END NOTE.). Government officials, NGOs, international organizations and others cooperated on the trafficking issue. In November 2005, the ROKG hosted an international conference on human trafficking, the third in an annual series. This year's conference focused on prosecuting international trafficking rings in the Asia-Pacific region.

¶18. (U) G. The ROKG adequately monitored its borders. Addressing a problem noted in previous TIP reports, the government took measures to assert law enforcement jurisdiction in the international transit lounge of Incheon

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International Airport.

¶19. (U) H. Fourteen government ministries coordinated their anti-TIP efforts through a task force that met quarterly. In addition, the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) worked to eliminate corruption in the government and private sector.

¶20. (SBU) J. (NOTE: Para I omitted in Ref A. END NOTE.). In 2003, the government created a Planning Unit on the Prevention of Prostitution. Its 12 members included government officials, three academics, one clergyman, five NGO representatives and one legal adviser. The Planning Unit in March 2004 created a Master Plan on the Prevention of Prostitution in March 2004. The 2004 Anti-Prostitution/Anti-Trafficking Laws were a main component of this plan.

PARAGRAPH 23: INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS

¶21. (U) A. In September 2004, the ROKG implemented legislation that specifically prohibited trafficking in persons and established a network of support resources for victims. The 2004 "Act on the Punishment of Intermediating in the Sex Trade and Associated Acts," provided for the punishment of human trafficking for the purpose of the sex trade and authorized the seizure of money and property acquired through trafficking. The law prohibited the sex trade; intermediating in the sex trade; human trafficking for the purpose of the sex trade; employing and recruiting others for the purpose of selling sex, or introducing and intermediating work with the knowledge that sex is traded; and, advertising for activities or an agency where the sex trade is carried out. The law provided that sex trade victims would not be subject to punishment and would also be entitled to certain procedural safeguards, such as closed trials. "Victims," under this law, were persons forced to sell sex by means of deceptive schemes, force or drug use. Juveniles, persons with serious disabilities and persons

trafficked for the purposes of the sex trade were also deemed victims. Further, monetary claims of traffickers against victims were invalidated regardless of the form or the pretext of the contract.

¶22. (U) A. (Cont.) Provisions of the Criminal Act and the Special Criminal Act could also be used to prosecute crimes related to trafficking in persons. For example:

-- Kidnapping minors by force or deception was illegal under Criminal Act Article 287 on Kidnapping of a Minor and was punishable by imprisonment of up to ten years;

-- Abuse of a person under one's protection or supervision was illegal under Criminal Act Article 273 on Cruelty and was punishable by imprisonment of up to two years or a fine of up to five million won (USD 5,119). A person who delivered a child under sixteen years of age who was under his protection or supervision to a proprietor or agent who would employ the child in work that was dangerous to life or limb was illegal under Criminal Act Article 274 on Hard Labor by a Child and was punishable by imprisonment of up to five years;

-- Kidnapping a person by force or deception for the purpose of gain, transportation to a foreign country or marriage was illegal under Criminal Act Article 288 and was punishable by imprisonment of no less than one year, Article 289 (penal servitude of no less than five years) and Article 291 (penal servitude of up to five years);

-- Falsely arresting or illegally confining another was illegal under Criminal Act Article 276 on False Arrest/Illegal Confinement and was punishable by imprisonment

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up to five years or a fine of up to seven million won (USD 7,167) and by Article 277 on Aggravated False Arrest/Aggravated Illegal Confinement which provided for penal servitude of up to seven years;

-- Intimidating another person was illegal under Criminal Act Article 283 on Intimidation and punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, or a fine of up to five million won (USD 5,119);

-- Using violence against another was punishable by Criminal Act Article 260 on Violence and was punishable by penal servitude for no more than two years or a fine of up to five million won (USD 5,119);

-- Inflicting bodily injury on another was illegal under Criminal Act Article 257 on Inflicting Bodily Injury and was punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years or a fine of up to 10 million won (USD 10,239);

¶23. (U) A. (Cont.) In addition, the Labor Standards Act prohibited forced labor, violence, and illegal exploitation and provided for penalties of imprisonment of up to five years or fines of up to 30 million won (USD 30,717). The Child Welfare Act and the Youth Protection Act prohibited child abuse and provided for imprisonment of up to ten years and fines of up to thirty million won (USD 30,717). The Immigration Control Act, the Passport Act, the Employment Security Act, and the Act Relating to Protection for Dispatched Workers also had provisions that prohibited crimes related to human trafficking.

¶24. (U) B. In addition, penalties for human traffickers were as follows:

-- A person who forced another by violence or intimidation to sell sex was subject to imprisonment of up to 10 years, a fine of up to 100 million won (USD 102,385), or both;

-- A member of a criminal organization or group who forced another by violence or intimidation to sell sex was subject

to imprisonment of at least one year;

-- a person who forced sex trade on another by detention or by showing collective force was subject to a prison term of at least three years;

-- a person who solicited sex trade customers or intermediated sex trade jobs was subject to imprisonment of up to three years, a fine of up to 30 million won (USD 30,717), or both;

-- a person who received compensation for intermediating in the sex trade as a business or introduced or intermediated sex-selling jobs was subject to imprisonment of up to seven years, a fine of up to 70 million won (USD 71,668), or both;

-- a person who bought or sold sex services was subject to a prison term of up to one year, a fine of up to three million won (USD 3,071), or both.

¶25. (U) C. Under the Criminal Act, rape and indecent act by compulsion were punishable by imprisonment of three to ten years (Article 297, 298). Penalties for rape or sexual assault and for sex trafficking were roughly equivalent.

¶26. (U) D. Prostitution in the ROK was illegal. The 2004 "Act on the Punishment of Intermediating in the Sex Trade and Associated Acts" provided for the punishment of human trafficking for the purpose of the sex trade and authorizes the seizure of money and property acquired through trafficking. The law prohibited the sex trade; intermediating in the sex trade; human trafficking for the purpose of the sex trade; employing and recruiting others for

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the purpose of selling sex, or introducing and intermediating work with the knowledge that sex is traded; and, advertising for activities or an agency where the sex trade is carried out.

¶27. (U) D. (Cont.) Significantly, the 2004 law provided that sex trade victims would not be subject to punishment and would also be entitled to certain procedural safeguards, such as closed trials. "Victims," under this law, were persons forced to sell sex by means of deceptive schemes, force or drug use. Juveniles, persons with serious disabilities and persons trafficked into the sex trade were also deemed victims.

¶28. (SBU) E. According to 2005 MOJ statistics, the arrest rate for prostitution-related offenses increased to 6.3 percent from 5.5 percent, and the prosecution rate increased to 61.5 percent in 2005 from 46.7 percent the previous year. Nearly all of these prosecutions resulted in "administrative trials," where defendants did not have to appear in court and were mostly subject to a fine. Some NGOs criticized the MOJ's failure to enforce the Anti-Trafficking/Anti-Prostitution Law to its fullest extent.

In particular, some NGOs noted the MOJ's reluctance to seek incarceration for offenders and failure to use the asset forfeiture provisions of the TIP laws (Ref C, D).

¶29. (SBU) F. According to informed sources, employment agencies received commission or introduction fees from owners of red-light district facilities and other sex-related venues where victims were forced into the sex trade. Police sources said transnational traffickers were based in the U.S., Korea, or elsewhere in Asia. The ROKG had no information on crime organizations involved in human trafficking cases and had no evidence that profits made by transnational crime organizations, travel agencies or marriage agencies were transferred to terrorist groups, guerrilla groups, judges or banks.

¶30. (SBU) G. The ROKG reported that it investigated cases of trafficking using, to the extent possible: emergency

arrest, restraint, search and seizure, communication intercepts, location tracking via mobile phones, electronic monitoring through cyber patrol and undercover investigations.

¶31. (U) H. The Supreme Prosecutor's Office (SPO) provided training at the Legal Research and Training Institute to prosecutors dedicated to human trafficking or crimes of violence, police authorities who handled violent crimes and others that worked on anti-trafficking operations. The KNPA also provided training on intelligence gathering and investigation methods through courses offered at the Police Comprehensive Academy and the National Scientific Criminal and Investigation Laboratory.

¶32. (SBU) I. The ROKG cooperated with other governments through the Act on International Judicial Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the Extradition Act. Police cooperation with the Embassy during the course of international trafficking and visa broker investigations.

¶33. (SBU) J. A criminal could be extradited to the U.S. and the other 21 signatory nations of the Extradition Act. Extradition to a non-signatory country was possible through a mutual guarantee. To date, no persons have been extradited for human trafficking.

¶34. (U) K. There was no evidence of government involvement in or tolerance of trafficking.

¶35. (U) L. There was no evidence of government involvement in trafficking.

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¶36. (SBU) M. In July, the National Youth Commission found that Korean fishermen were greatly responsible for the commercial sexual exploitation of children in the Pacific Ocean island nation of Kiribati. Some NGOs have expressed growing concern about Korean sex tourism to China, the Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Although prosecutors had the authority to bring extraterritorial charges of sex crimes against Korean nationals, no charges were reported.

¶37. (U) N. The ROK ratified ILO Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor in March 2001; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography in September 2000; and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, in December 2000. The ROK has not signed ILO Conventions 29 and 105 on forced labor.

PARAGRAPH 23: PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS

¶38. (U) A. The 2004 "Act on the Prevention of the Sex Trade and Protection of its Victims," authorized the establishment of assistance facilities and counseling centers that would help sex trade victims reintegrate into society. In particular, the ROKG would have to provide support facilities for victims, including foreign victims, that would provide for room and board; counseling; medical support and legal assistance. The law identified four types of assistance facilities: (1) general assistance facilities, which provide board and housing for up to six months and support the independence of sex trade victims; (2) juvenile assistance facilities, which provide board and housing for up to one year and support the independence of juvenile sex trade victims through school enrollment and education; (3) assistance facilities for foreign women, which provide board and housing for up to three months and support the victims' return home; and (4) self-support assistance centers, which provide job and technical training, employment information

and other social adjustment services for sex trade victims. Under the law, state and local governments are also authorized to establish counseling centers, which would provide counseling and engage in the rescue of sex trade victims. In 2005, there were 23 general shelters, 16 shelters for teenage victims, two shelters for foreign nationals, two rehabilitation shelters, four group homes and 29 counseling centers. The MOGEF also established a Center for Women's Human Rights to provide overall assistance to trafficking prevention facilities.

¶39. (U) A. (Cont.) For foreign women, the Ministry of Justice had the authority to grant victims of trafficking either a G-1 visa ("others" visa category under the immigration law) or to suspend their departure until damage claims and redress of rights had been settled. Like ROK nationals, foreign women were eligible for board and lodging, professional counseling, legal and medical services.

¶40. (U) B. The ROKG provided monetary support to NGOs that provided social, legal and medical services to trafficking and sex trade victims. Victims in shelters were eligible to receive medical assistance in accordance with the Medical Expenses Act. Medical services not stipulated by the Medical Expenses Act were provided by various rehabilitation funds, amounting to 4.5 million Korean won (USD 4,571) per person. A total of 4,185 victims received medical treatment during the first half of 2005. ROKG-funded vocational and retraining programs in 2005 resulted in 24 victims starting their own businesses and 239 finding legitimate employment or enrolling in school.

¶41. (U) C. If classified as a victim of the sex trade, a
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person would be referred to a shelter or support facilities related to the MOGEF. Persons classified not as victims but as willing participants in the sex trade (and in violation of the law) would also be eligible for treatment and counseling.

¶42. (U) D. ROK law specifically provided that victims of trafficking were to be treated as victims, not criminals. The law further provided that deportation orders for foreign victims of trafficking who reported a trafficking offense were to be suspended until the conclusion of the investigation or until their claims were redressed.

¶43. (U) E. The Act on the Punishment of Intermediating in Sex Trade and Associated Acts stipulated that monetary compensation should be given to those who reported crimes involving human trafficking. The amount of money would be determined by the reporter's contribution to solving the case, financial damage suffered by the reporter because of the report, and whether the reporter was involved in the crime. The Crime Victims Support Division, which had branches at over 50 prosecutors offices nationwide, supported victims by providing information on their cases, personal protection, and counseling services. The Division also helped victims take legal action.

¶44. (SBU) E. (Cont.) Debt bondage has been one of the most prevalent means of keeping women in the ROK sex industry. Some NGOs succeeded in helping victims successfully to sue brothel owners and managers to nullify debt accumulated as a result of the sex trade (Ref D). (NOTE: As a result, brothel owners were reportedly beginning to force women to borrow money from secondary financial sources, thus making it more difficult to prove a connection between the accrued debt and prostitution. END NOTE.).

¶45. (U) F. The Act on the Protection of Reporters and Associated Persons of Specific Crime stipulated that, when the court or the investigation authorities investigated a victim in a human trafficking case, or put the victim on a witness stand, personal protection measures should be taken for the victim, and the victim could apply for related

financial aid. The law also stipulated that the victim in a sex trade case was free to leave the country according to her will. The government was not authorized to prevent a victim in a sex trade case from leaving the country.

¶46. (U) F. The Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Specific Violent Crimes and the Act on the Protection of Reporters of Specific Crimes provided that when a victim in a human trafficking case reported a crime or testified in court, the victim's identity and related information could not be disclosed. The Act on the Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims Thereof protected the victim during prosecution and trial by prohibiting the disclosure of the victim's identity and allowing a closed-door hearing. According to the Act on the Punishment of Intermediating in Sex Trade and Associated Acts, when the court or the authorities questioned a victim, their representative could be present. The law also stated that, during the investigation, the victim was eligible to receive protection and guidance from counselors specializing in sex trade victim counseling.

¶47. (U) G. The ROKG provided training programs for 74 regional government officials in 2005. The training covered on-site investigation and protection of trafficking victims; trafficking prevention by developing ongoing relationships with NGOs; and trafficking prevention-related laws and policies.

¶48. (U) G. (Cont.) The ROKG reported in 2005 that it did not support victims of human trafficking, or NGOs that supported trafficking victims, through its embassies or consulates.

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¶49. (U) H. Repatriated nationals who were victims of trafficking were eligible for the same social, legal and medical support services available for domestic victims of trafficking.

¶50. (U) I. A variety of international organizations and NGOs worked with trafficking victims, including International Organization for Migration, the Asia Foundation, the SAGE Foundation, Korea Women's Associations United, Women Migrants Human Rights Center, Hansori House of Friends, the Jeon Jin Sang Social Welfare Center in Anyang, Magdalena House and Saewoomtuh for Prostituted Women. The NGOs provided information and counseling services, as well as medical, legal, and social support.

BEST PRACTICES

¶51. (U) While many government agencies and NGOs were involved in impressive projects to fight trafficking and rescue survivors, the following two projects stood out for their creativity, potential to effect positive change, and ability to be replicated elsewhere. Post nominates the MOJ "John School" and the Magdalena House Internship Program for inclusion in the Best Practices section of the 2006 TIP Report.

¶52. (U) The John School: Loosely benchmarking the San Francisco-based SAGE Foundation's program for sex offenders, the MOJ has created a "John School" to educate men about the hidden costs of prostitution (Ref H). The School is an eight-hour class offered on Saturdays at 16 locations throughout the ROK. In a typical session, participants will engage in discussion with victim advocates, who are sometimes former trafficking victims, regarding the harm that prostitution can inflict on families and the community. Attendees also receive information on HIV/AIDS prevention and participate in role-playing exercises and group counseling sessions. Although this program is still in its infancy, Post believes this program may make a significant impact in

changing attitudes in a critical target group of first offenders and reducing the demand for prostitution in the ROK. In order to maximize the chances of this program's success, Post is facilitating a consultancy relationship between the SAGE Foundation and the MOJ and has also nominated the MOJ program's creator, Prosecutor Lee Young-joo, for an International Visitor Program grant.

¶53. (U) Magdalena House Internship Program: Once victims of the sex industry overcome the trauma of their experience, finding legitimate employment becomes a major challenge. Some try to open their own businesses, but struggle because they lack experience. In addition, they also tend to focus on the clothing or beauty industries, which are prone to instability and rapid turnover. In order to develop more sustainable employment, the Magdalena House, a shelter and support center in central Seoul, initiated partnerships with local business associations, including the Korean Women Entrepreneurs' Association (Seoul Chapter), Korean Foundation for Women, and Caritas Seoul, (Ref C). Since 2003, Magdalena House has placed about four to five trafficking survivors per year to work as interns members' businesses. These internships, which generally lasted six months, helped participants gain valuable business skills.

EMBASSY POINT OF CONTACT AND TIME REPORT

¶54. (SBU) Mission point of contact for TIP issues is Political Officer Michael Kleine, tel. 82-2-397-4213, fax 82-2-733-4791. In support of this report, Embassy Seoul has spent approximately 1,376 hours researching trafficking issues, coordinating with contacts, participating in USFK anti-trafficking initiatives, and pursuing visa broker

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investigations over the past year. This total includes:

Ambassador: 6 hours
DCM: 4 hours
FE/MC/CON: 5 hours
MC/POL: 1 hour
02-level POL: 5 hours
02-level POL: 315 hours
04-level CON: 1040 hours (visa broker investigations)
VERSHBOW